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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PRoCEDURE-JunGMENTs--PLEA OF GuIL'l'Y IN CRIMINAL ACTION AS
BASIS FOR CoLLATERAL EsTOPPEL IN LATER CIVIL ACTION-Defendant had
pleaded guilty to specific criminal charges under the False Claims Act.1 The
United States then sued defendant to recover civil damages under the Contract
Settlement Act2 on the same fact situation. When defendant attempted to contest the verity of facts to which he had pleaded guilty in the earlier criminal
action, the United States attempted to have defendant estopped as a matter of
res judicata, asking the court for a directed verdict as to the issues decided in
the criminal action. Held, directed verdict as to those issues to which the
defendant had pleaded guilty would be granted when separated from matters
based on new issues and facts. United States v. Bower, (D.C. Tenn. 1951) 95
F. Supp. 19.
Collateral estoppel, a form of res judicata, can be described as the doctrine
which bars the raising of the verity of a question of right or fact that has been
decided by a competent court between the parties in a prior and different cause
of action.8 An example is where a plaintiff has two causes of action based on
similar facts. Plaintiff sues on one cause of action and recovers a judgment;
then in a suit on the second cause of action, defendant is estopped from challenging the verity of the ultimate facts found in the first cause of action.4 This
doctrine is clearly recognized when both the first and second suits are civil in
nature, although its application is sometimes difficult. 5 The court in the principal case is faced with the example just given, but with this difference: in the
principal case, the first cause of action was a criminal one in which the defendant pleaded guilty. When discussing the general doctrine of collateral estoppel
in cases in which both actions are civil in nature, courts use broad language
which could well include a situation in which the first cause of action was
criminal in nature.6 The writer has not found a court ~ing language which
would deny the doctrine where the first suit was criminal. In fact, in the few
occasions in which this matter has arisen, it may be said that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel has been applied. When the defendant had been convicted
of yiolating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, he was estopped to deny facts found
162 Stat. L. 698 (1948), 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §287.
41 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §119.
s Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715 (1948); McIntosh v. Wiggins, (8th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 316; Divide Creek Irr. District v. Hollingsworth, (10th
Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 859.
4 The court in the principal case is concerned only with deciding whether the doctrine
of collateral estoppel should apply, and not to what facts it should apply. For a discussion
of the type facts that may come under the doctrine, see The Evergreens v. Nunan, (2d
Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 927.
6 Scott, "Collateral Estoppel by Judgment," 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942).
6 See cases cited in note 3 supra.
"2

600

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW .

[ Vol. 50

by the jury both in a later civil injunction suit brought by the govemment,7
and in a suit brought by a private party to recover damages. 8 When defendant
had been convicted of murder, she was estopped to deny the facts of the murder
in a subsequent civil action to collect from the United States the deceased's
War Risk Insurance. 9 In none of the above situations did it appear that the
defendant pleaded guilty. The facts found by the jury constituted the basis for
the subsequent civil action.10 Assuming that an innocent party rarely pleads
guilty, it appears to be no greater hardship on him than if the first action had
been civil and he had consented to an adverse judgment.11 'It must be noted
that this is a case in which mutuality of estoppel is lacking;12 although the
parties to the two actions are the same, it is certain that had the defendant been
acquitted in the criminal proceedings, the government would not have been
estopped to bring the subsequent civil action based on the same fact situation.13
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7 Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. United St.ttes, 291 U.S.
293, 54 S.Ct. 397 (1934).
8 Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (7th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 967.
9 Austin v. United States, (7th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 816.
10 It is interesting to note that in a majority of jurisdictions evidence of a prior criminal conviction of the defendant based on the same transaction and involving similar facts
is inadmissible in a civil action unless the defendant pleaded guilty to the crime. Interstate
Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W.Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922); see also 31 A.L.R.
258.
11 If the first action had been civil in nature, there would be no question that a consent judgment would have the same effect as if the matter had been fully litigated. Biggio
v. Magee, 272 Mass. 185, 172 N.E. 336 (1930).
12 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§428, 429 (1925).
1a Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630 (1938).

